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1 Introduction
It is well documented that subsidized private sector employment programs (SPSEPs) in
which the government pays firms to provide experience to unemployed workers, seem to
perform relatively well in bringing unemployed back to work.1 This might be the result of
both private sector involvement and the potential for cream-skimming, i.e. selecting the
most employable unemployed for the program. This paper investigates the effectiveness of
a pure private employment program to find out whether a private program without cream-
skimming can also be beneficial for both unemployed workers and firms. We investigate
this by analyzing the effectiveness of a large Dutch firms’ employment program compared
to the performance of contemporary public programs, based on a unique data set about
1000 participants covering a period of 27 years. We find that this pure private program
performs markedly better than public programs, implying that the private components also
in absence of cream-skimming lead to good outcomes.
One of the private components that give SPSEPs an advantage over other forms of
Active Labor Market Policy (ALMP), is that SPSEPs more closely resemble a regular work
environment and hence facilitate the build up of relevant human capital (Sianesi (2008)).
Other advantages of private involvement include participation in a SPSEP works as positive
signalling towards future employers (Gerfin et al. (2005)) and similarly it is a very direct way
of demonstrating one’s abilities to employers (Graversen (2004)). Although these benefits
can be ascribed to private sector involvement, these programs are still initiated, designed,
administrated and evaluated by the public sector. Several aspects of this program setup
create scope for cream-skimming. First, since these programs are mostly evaluated based
on their post-program effects, caseworkers have an incentive to select the most employable
instead of those who stand to benefit most from it. (Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)).
Second, Martin and Swank (2004) show that persuading firms to participate in AMLP
entails more than just a wage subsidy and, somewhat related, Martin and Grubb (2001)
present results that suggest that firms’ participation in these programs is positively linked
to the quality of participants they can expect. Thus even if caseworkers were able to identify
flawlessly those who would benefit most from participation, they would need to think twice
before actually selecting them, as these participants might not satisfy the firms expected
quality.
In case of a pure private program there is obviously no need to persuade the firm to
participate since it is their own program. Hence the delicate balancing act is no longer
required. A pure private program would still enjoy the advantages already mentioned and
not suffer from cream-skimming. In addition, it may be attractive for a firm to run a private
ALMP for reasons we will investigate.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We elaborate on the program we
study in Section 2. In Section 3 we analyze the outflow data of the program and in Section
1See for instance Kluve (2010), Card, Kluve and Weber (2009) for metastudies confirming this or
Jaenichen and Stephan (2009), Sianesi (2008), Graversen and Jensen (2006) and Carling and Richardson
(2004) for microeconometric evaluation studies confirming this.
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4 we discuss the deadweight loss and relative performance of the program. In Section 5 we
present a number of benefits for the firm when running a pure private labor market program.
Section 6 concludes.
2 A private initiative: The Philips Employment Scheme (WGP)
The unemployment rate in the Netherlands rose dramatically in the early eighties peaking at
a record high of 10.2% in 1983 (CPB (2009)). Among the unemployed were a large number
of youngsters, below age 23. In 1982 the government and unions agreed on a package of
reforms called the Wassenaar agreement. An important element of this agreement was an
economy-wide reduction in working hours to split the same amount of work into more jobs.
However, Philips Electronics, the Dutch originating multinational known for amongst others
its household appliances and lighting products, preferred a different approach to combat
unemployment and make its contribution in these times of need. Since it was one of the
largest employers in the Netherlands, it was able to implement its own course of action.
Instead of reducing working hours, Philips created the ‘Youth Work Plan’ (JWP) which
was the predecessor of the WGP. The JWP offered unemployed youngsters one year of work
and training with Philips and had 639 participants by the end of 1983 - its inaugural year
(van der Bruggen and van Schagen (2001)). The JWP ran successfully until 1986 at which
time the number of youth unemployed had declined substantially. According to van der
Bruggen and van Schagen (2001) the apparent success of the JWP led unions to embrace it,
which in turn led Philips and the unions to incorporate the JWP into the centralized wage
agreement. This meant that part of Philips’s wage budget was allocated to the program. At
the same time the scope of the program was expanded to include other groups of unemployed;
the JWP morphed into WGP. The basic setup however, remained largely unchanged and
still entailed one year of full-time employment and training at Philips. Participants receive
the legal minimum wage and the training component’s objective is to obtain a vocational
qualification and therefore includes a substantial theoretical component.
By design, employment in the WGP is not conflicting with existing (regular) employment
at Philips. Moreover, strict monitoring by independent auditors ensures that the target
group of disadvantaged unemployed is indeed reached. Each year the HRM department of
Philips allocates WGP jobs over the various Philips establishments. The main consideration
for this allocation are the future job prospects of participants. Since Philips has plants and
offices operating in various industrial sectors and regions throughout the Netherlands, the
future job prospects differ per region and subsequently the choice as to which outlets are
assigned to open WGP jobs matters (Welters (2005)). Due to this regional and sectoral
variation, this allocation process turns out to an interactive process between the central
HRM department and local HRM staff. Philips aims at a yearly WGP inflow of one percent
of total employment at Philips.
Figure 1 shows the number of participants entering the WGP compared to total Philips
employment and related to unemployment. On average Philips attains the one percent tar-
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Figure 1: WGP inflow
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get, but the inflow varies substantially over time, which several WGP managers attribute to
the difficulty to attract suitable candidates during economic upswings. The figure corrobo-
rates this finding since the periods in which the one percent target is not attained feature
low unemployment.
The data used to construct the figures in this section originate from WGP annual reports
from 1987 to 2008. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the most important variables
in this dataset. The most striking feature of the data is the job finding rate of almost
Table 1: Summary of annual data
Variable (N=22 years) Years Mean Min Max
Total employment PhilipsNL 1987-2010 36,202 14,217 70,942
Total inflow 1987-2009 427 143 768
% males in inflow 1988-2009 57.1 38 76
Average age of inflow 1988-2009 31.2 23.5 35.8
Job finding rate 6 weeks after WGP exit 1987-2007 60.7 40 79
Job finding rate 1 year after WGP exit 1995-2007 69.6 50 84
70% measured one year after WGP exit. Thus at first glance the WGP seems to perform
admirably, which justifies more subtle and in depth analysis of the performance of the WGP.
This performance crucially depends on three stages: selection of the participants, treatment
and outflow counseling. In the subsequent section we elaborate on the design of each of
these stages.
2.1 Selection
To obtain a comprehensive view of the selection and supervision of participants, we con-
ducted interviews with all partners involved. The market for reintegration services is partly
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privatized in the Netherlands. Therefore our sample contains a mix of public and private
intermediaries. We interviewed six intermediaries; five private sector and one public sector
intermediary. Together these six intermediaries provide candidates and counseling for more
than sixty percent of all WGP positions. They negotiate the entire spectrum of unemployed
persons and as such are key experts to assess whether unemployed candidates that are pro-
posed for the WGP differ in characteristics from other unemployed. In addition they are
able to compare the WGP to public ALMPs. Furthermore, interviews have been conducted
with Philips internal WGP coordinators who are responsible for (1) the final step of the
selection process and (2) the supervision of the candidate. Nine out of ten interviews took
place face-to-face, one interview was conducted by telephone.
Four selection criteria apply. First, a candidate must be formally registered as unem-
ployed.2 The WGP then explicitly targets those unemployed with the largest distance to
the labor market, which is the second criterion: that is, long term unemployed, early school
leavers, unemployed from ethnic minorities, persons with a disability and higher educated
persons with weak ties to the labor market. Third, a candidate should have the potential
to successfully complete the practical and theoretical training component that is part of
the WGP treatment. Philips cooperates with the public and private intermediaries to find
candidates that match these three criteria. It is anticipated that a candidate should possess
a certain level of willingness and motivation to participate and this constitutes the fourth
criterion, which is tested at the relevant Philips outlet.
From the interviews we concluded that there is no evidence of systematic cream-skimming.
If an intermediary would continuously provide candidates that prematurely drop out back
into unemployment, Philips might switch to another intermediary to supply them with WGP
candidates. On the other hand, if the intermediaries supply only very high quality candi-
dates, these candidates would most likely drop out of the program within a short period of
time since they (with their good qualities) would find a job elsewhere with a higher wage
than the standard minimum wage that the WGP offers. This would be unwanted since the
aim of the WGP is to be a one year treatment that reaches those who benefit most from it.
In addition to our qualitative interview-based evidence, Table 2 provides some quanti-
tative evidence of the (un)employability of participants. Until several years ago, the public
employment services assigned the unemployed to degrees of employability, where degree one
indicated an easily employable person and degree four a hardly employable person. Table
2 is based on a sample of our data that contains this labeling. The participants in this
sample have been positioned throughout different Philips outlets between August 2002 and
April 2003. Therefore this sample implicitly includes the efforts of various intermediaries
and various Philips floor managers and WGP coordinators. Over ninety percent of partic-
ipants in this sample are considered to be ‘legitimate’ program participants (degrees, 2, 3
and 4) and almost seventy percent of the participants in this sample are considered tough
or virtually impossible to reintegrate as they belong to degrees three and four. Less than
2An exception to this rule was made for three groups: women reentering the labor market, early school
leavers and disabled.
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Table 2: Employability of WGP inflow: a sample of August 2002 - April 2003
Degree Definition In WGP % Cum.
sample
4 Unemployable 10 10.9 10.9
3 Unemployed with such a distance to the labor market that 53 57.6 68.5
job-finding chances have been reduced significantly
2 Unemployed who are less easily employable but are able to 21 22.8 91.3
find a job within a year with support of schooling or subsidy
1 Unemployed who are easily employable and can find a job 8 8.7 100
without financial support within a reasonable time span
Total 92 100
nine percent of participants are from the most employable segment of unemployed. Taking
into consideration that the sample covers a period of rising unemployment (see Figure 1)
and hence a growing stock of ‘fresh’ unemployed, the low percentage of degree 1 participants
provides further reassurance that no systematic cream-skimming takes place in the selection
process.
2.2 Treatment and outflow counseling
The treatment in the WGP consists of one year of work experience combined with formal
training that leads to a vocational qualification. Since the end of the nineties, half of the
WGP participants start with a five month pre-program because their initial qualifications
are too low to enter the WGP directly. They would not be able to attain the vocational
qualification within the standard WGP timeframe of one year. After this pre-program they
enter the WGP proper (van der Bruggen (2004)). Many participants are also not able to
complete the entire WGP treatment in one year and are offered a 6-12 month extension.
These developments exemplify the large distance to the labor market of many candidates
and the determination to target those who need it most.
The type of training that a participant receives depends on the nature of the particular
WGP job. Many of the WGP participants still complete the VaPro degree, which is a widely
recognized qualification in the Dutch process industry. However, due to changes in the labor
market and in the qualifications of participants, there has been an increase in the number
of participants that complete a degree in other fields such as administrative, secretarial and
ICT skills. The knowledge and skills acquired during the training are brought into practice
on the job. Throughout the entire WGP period the participant receives regular supervision,
counseling and guidance primarily from within Philips but also from the UWV.
Outflow counseling starts three to six months before the end of the WGP period and
is provided by the intermediary that proposed the participant for the program. Specific
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counseling activities vary but generally include individual job interview training and personal
development training. Six weeks and one year after exiting the WGP participants are
interviewed with regard to their WGP experiences. See Appendix I for more information on
these data, which cover the 1997-2006 period. One question in the interview is if the former
WGP participant is currently employed. The aggregate answer to this question is shown in
Figure 2.
Figure 2: Aggregate job success of WGP
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On average sixty percent of ex-participants report to be employed when interviewed six
weeks after exiting the WGP whereas this increases to seventy percent after one year. On
average 15% of participants were employed by Philips after the end of the WGP period,
while this figure has varied from 11 to 34 percent.3 When asked about their general opinion
on their WGP period, on average seventy percent of respondents answer ‘satisfied’ or ‘very
satisfied’ (on a five point scale).
3 Performance of the WGP
In Section 2 we found that on average seventy percent of ex-participants hold a job when
interviewed one year after leaving the WGP. In this section we take a closer look at the WGP
to investigate what factors influence its job finding rate and the quality of its participants.
3.1 Who get a job after WGP?
To analyze the determinants of the job-finding rate of the WGP participants, we used both
aggregate annual data and individual interview data. The estimation results are presented in
Table 3. The aggregate model uses the job finding rate (as shown in Figure 2) as dependent
3In Section 3 we present estimates showing that young and academically qualified participants are more
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Table 3: Explaining participants’ job finding chances, 1999-2007
Data used Yearly aggregates Individual
Period 1988-2007 1999-2007
Regression OLS Probit
Dependent variable Job finding rate Job finding dummy
Unemployment at time of inflow 7.00∗∗∗ (1.99) 0.34∗∗∗ (0.10)
Unemployment at time of outflow −9.22∗∗∗ (1.87) −0.53∗∗∗ (0.10)
Age −0.03∗∗∗ (0.01)
Gender 0.04 (0.09)
Prior education:
Average educational attainmenta 0.10∗∗∗ (0.02)
Primary school −0.06 (0.16)
Low level vocational/secondary −0.02 (0.10)
Middle level vocational/secondary reference
High level vocational −0.02 (0.12)
University 0.29∗ (0.15)
Unemployment status −0.51∗∗∗ (0.15)
Unemployment duration:
0-6 months reference
6-12 months 0.04 (0.13)
12-24 months −0.14 (0.13)
24-48 months 0.15 (0.15)
48+ months −0.00 (0.16)
If unemployed, what age:
Age 16-30 reference
Age 31-40 0.34 ∗ ∗ (0.15)
Age 41-50 0.30 (0.22)
Age 51+ 0.26 (0.31)
Constant −0.25 (0.18) 2.00∗∗∗ (0.40)
N 20 years 982
R2 0.77
Durbin-Watson D-statistic 2.16
Correctly classified by probit model 62.95%
∗∗∗ = significant at 1%, ∗∗ = significant at 5%, ∗ = significant at 10%
aAverage number of years of schooling
Standard errors in parentheses
variable and the individual model uses a job finding dummy. Both models show a positive
relation between the job finding rate/dummy and unemployment at time of inflow and a
negative relation with unemployment at time of outflow. This second relation suggests that
higher unemployment at time of outflow means a lower chance to find a job. This seems
logical as more job seekers compete for the same number of jobs. The first relation indicates
that participants who enter the WGP when unemployment is high, have a higher chance to
find a job after their treatment than participants who enter the program in a low unemploy-
ment period. This is consistent with findings from for instance Kluve (2010) and Lechner
likely to be employed by Philips after completing the WGP than others.
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and Wunsch (2009). Lechner and Wunsch show that ‘all else equal’ a higher unemployment
at time of inflow into (training) programs correlates positively with the programs’ effects.4
However, even though our individual model corrects for some participant characteristics, we
suspect that the positive relation between unemployment at time of inflow and the program
success is also driven by unobserved participant characteristics which are more favorable
when the pool of unemployed is large. Evidence of this is given in the discussion of Table 5.
With regard to educational background the aggregate model shows that a higher av-
erage educational attainment corresponds with a higher average job finding rate, whereas
the individual model only shows a slightly higher chance of finding a job for participants
with a university degree. The variable ‘Unemployment status’ is a dummy variable that
distinguishes participants that entered the WGP without having been formerly registered as
unemployed (dummy=0, remember from Section 2.1 that these consist of women reentering
the labor force, early school leavers and disabled) from those that had a registered unemploy-
ment history (dummy=1). We observe that participants without a registered unemployment
history have a higher chance to find a job after the WGP. A possible explanation for this
could be that these participants are more intrinsically motivated to get back to work (in the
case of women reentering the labor force because they make the deliberate choice to re-enter
the labor force) and that they have not suffered from a discouraged worker effect.
Age and gender have no significant impact on the aggregate model or its robustness and
were left out. However, the individual model shows that an increase in age has a negative
effect on the chances of finding a job. Interacting age-groups with the ‘unemployment status
dummy’ shows that participants between age 31 and 40 have a higher chance of finding a
job after the WGP than the reference group of 16 to 30 year old’s. Both the duration of
unemployment and gender are not significant in the individual model. This suggests the
WGP is quite successful, given the intrinsic qualities of the candidates.5
3.2 A closer look at the inflow of the WGP
To further investigate if higher unemployment leads to better qualified participants we zoom
in on the (dynamics of) the inflow quality in the WGP. For these analyses we use informa-
tion for about 8,900 WGP participants - see Appendix I for details. The only available
information is age, education, gender and start year and duration of WGP. In Table 4 we
present OLS estimates of the effect of ‘unemployment at time of inflow’, gender and age on
the quality of participants. 6 The quality of participants is measured as the ratio of the
participant’s years of schooling to the labor force average years of schooling in the year of
inflow. We constructed this ratio to correct for possible bias that might arise due to the
rising trend in the labor force’s overall education level. The first result we observe is that,
the higher the unemployment rate at time of inflow, the higher the educational attainment
4One explanation they provide is that in times of high unemployment, non-participants experience fewer
job matches or worse matches than when unemployment is low and this reflects negatively on their future
prospects, whereas program participants enjoy a stable program situation and do not incur unfavorable
matches.
5We tested this model on several levels of geographical aggregation for unemployment -i.e. also looking
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Table 4: Effect of labor market conditions on participants quality, 1987-2006
Educational attainmenta
Unemployment at time of inflow 0.04 (0.00)∗∗∗
Gender:
Male reference
Female −0.04 (0.01)∗∗∗
Age groups:
16 - 30 years reference
31 - 40 years −0.02 (0.01) ∗ ∗
41 - 50 years −0.04 (0.01)∗∗∗
> 50 years −0.06 (0.03) ∗ ∗
Constant 0.74 (0.02)∗∗∗
R2 0.06
N 6611
∗∗∗ = significant at 1%, ∗∗ = significant at 5%, ∗ = significant at 10%
a Participant’s years of schooling to labor force average years of schooling ratio
Standard errors in parentheses
of participants entering the WGP. Whether this results from self-selection or selection by
UWV/Philips cannot be answered with certainty. Albeit neither gratifying nor original to
argue, it’s most likely a combination of both. We also find that, relative to participants from
the age group of 16 - 30 year, participants from older age groups have a lower educational
attainment relative to the labor force average. This is not surprising since recent generations
stay in education longer and hence the average educational attainment of the labor force
has risen steadily during the last decades. Finally we observe that female WGP participants
appear to have a lower educational attainment.
By analyzing the time participants spent in the WGP we can provide an alternative
analysis which more clearly shows the business cycle effect on the quality of inflow.7 A
‘bread-and-butter’ WGP treatment takes twelve months. Thus when a person takes more
than twelve months to complete he or she apparently needs more time to be deemed ready
for outflow, and is likely to have been relatively less qualified at time of inflow.8 Based on
this assumption we construct a dummy variable equal to ‘0’ when participants spent at most
twelve months in the WGP, and equal to ‘1’ for participants who spent more than twelve
months in the WGP.9 We tested the sensitivity of this dummy to the business cycle and the
characteristics of the inflow with a probit model. Table 5 contains the results.
We observe that women are less likely to spend more than twelve months in the WGP and
that middle aged participants are more likely to stay longer in the WGP than the youngest
at regional and municipal unemployment. However, the results remain qualitatively the same.
6Again we also looked at various levels of geographical aggregation for unemployment and again we found
qualitatively the same results.
7As presented in Appendix I, our ‘8900 dataset’ contains a variable measuring the time spent in the
WGP. This is measured as duration in months.
8In Section 2.2 we already mentioned that less qualified participants are regularly offered a 6 or 12 months
extension.
9Since an extension lasts a fixed 6 or 12 months there is hardly any variation in the duration so we used
a dummy variable instead of actual duration in months.
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Table 5: Effect of business cycle and inflow characteristics on time spent in
WGP, 1987-2006
Duration dummy
Unemployment at time of inflow −0.20 (0.02)∗∗∗
Gender:
Male reference
Female −0.40 (0.05)∗∗∗
Age groups:
Age 16-30 reference
Age 31-40 0.12 (0.05) ∗ ∗
Age 41-50 0.27 (0.07)∗∗∗
Age 51+ 0.23 (0.15)
Prior education:
Primary school reference
Low level vocational 0.08 (0.07)
Low level secondary −0.10 (0.08)
Middle level vocational −0.05 (0.07)
Middle level secondary −0.16 (0.11)
Top level secondary −0.17 (0.16)
High level vocational −0.37 (0.10)∗∗∗
University −0.46 (0.12)∗∗∗
Constant 0.03 (0.11)
Correctly specified by probit model 91.45%
N 6611
∗∗∗ = significant at 1%, ∗∗ = significant at 5%, ∗ = significant at 10%
Standard errors in parentheses
participants. Furthermore both high level vocational and university educated participants
are less prone to spend more than twelve months in the WGP. The business cycle effect
manifests itself as the negative relation between unemployment at time of inflow and the
duration dummy. When the labor market is tight and unemployment is low at time of
inflow, participants have a higher chance to spend more than twelve months in the WGP
and are likely to be less qualified. Thus participants are ‘locked-in’ the WGP longer when
unemployment was low at time of inflow. However, our explanation (a person needs more
time in the WGP to be qualified enough to successfully exit the WGP) differs from the
usual explanation that ‘locking-in’ occurs due to reduced job search efforts on behalf of the
participant. Thus even though we correct for several significant participant characteristics we
still find that the unemployment rate at time of inflow matters for the duration spent in the
WGP. This supports our impression from Table 3 that unobserved participant characteristics
vary with the size of the pool of unemployed.
4 Relative performance and deadweight loss of the WGP
We now turn to comparing the performance of the WGP to the performance of contemporary
public re-integration efforts.
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4.1 Performance of public re-integration efforts
In 2008 a detailed study on re-integration policies was published. This study was com-
missioned by the Council for Work and Income, an important advisory body to the Dutch
government and social partners. This study uses several social security datasets, observing
every person that has been unemployed between 1999 and 2005 including details on their
treatment. For details we kindly refer to the original study (Groot et al. (2008)). Using
a duration model, they were able to measure the effect of public re-integration efforts. In
Table 6 we reproduce some of the numbers calculated by Groot et al and we use these to
calculate the job finding rate for treated and untreated clients.
Table 6: Performance of public re-integration efforts (1999-2005)
1 2 3 4
Total exit Exit to work Job finding rate Effect of public
percentage (untreated) treatment
Unemp. duration
up to 1 year 74% 78% 57.7% 0.9%
1-3 years 15% 63% 9.5% 1.3%a
3+ years 10% 29% 2.9% 0%b
a Effect of treatment if treatment started in 2nd year
b Effect of treatment if treatment started later than the 2nd year
Source: Columns 1,2 and 4 from Groot et al. (2008).
Column one shows the percentage of clients that flow out of unemployment within the
mentioned duration. Subsequently, column 2 shows what percentage of this outflow is out-
flow to work. Hence multiplying these first two columns gives the job finding rate within
the specified duration for untreated unemployed. Finally, column four reports the treatment
effect of public re-integration efforts. Focussing on the first row, we see that persons who
become unemployed have a 57.7% chance of finding a job within the first year of unemploy-
ment. If a public re-integration treatment is started in this first year, the chance of finding
a job within 1.5 years after the start of the treatment increases with 0.9 percentage point.
(Groot et al. (2008)). The remainder of the table is read in the same manner and shows that
a treatment started in the second year of unemployment is somewhat more effective. Groot
et al (2008) conclude from this that in the first year it is apparently hard to select the un-
employed that need the treatment most and as a consequence unemployed who would have
found a job on their own are treated instead. This cream-skimming results in so called ‘dead-
weight loss’; some treated unemployed would have found a job even without the help of the
treatment. This has two implications. First, the person receiving the unnecessary treatment
is locked-into unemployment longer than necessary. Second, these unnecessary treatments
take up valuable treatment slots for persons that actually do need the treatment, as capacity
for reintegration treatments is limited. Hence, a carefully designed selection process without
cream-skimming can, ceteris paribus, minimize deadweight loss and help to achieve a high
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treatment effect. In section 4.2 we will calculate the deadweight loss of the WGP and use
this to compare the WGP to the public treatment.
Groot et al (2008) make another interesting observation which we need to point out for
future reference. They find that already after 3 months in unemployment an individual’s
job finding rate (untreated) starts to decline rapidly. A part of this is a selection-effect, i.e.
the unemployed with the best set of characteristics find a job fast and hence the chances
to find work for the remaining unemployed population decline. However, they argue that
persons becoming unemployed are quite homogeneous in the sense that they all have recent
employment history. So initially their distance to the labor market is not that large and
thus the observed decline of the job finding rate after three months is likely to be more
dominated by a duration-effect than a selection-effect. The longer one is unemployed, the
larger the distance to the labor market becomes (Groot et al. (2008)).
4.2 Deadweight loss and relative performance of WGP
We can quantify the deadweight loss of the WGP using the information that we have pre-
sented so far. First, we know the job finding rate for untreated unemployed by duration of
unemployment from Table 6. Second, we also know how many participants have entered the
WGP by unemployment duration (see Appendix I). If we combine these two figures, we can
calculate how many of the participants of the WGP would have found a job without WGP
treatment while correcting for unemployment duration.10 This is the deadweight loss of the
WGP. In Table 7 we present our calculation.
Table 7: Deadweight loss of WGP (1999-2005)
1 2 3
Job finding rate WGP population Deadweight loss
untreated by duration
Duration in WW
up to 1 year 57.7% 51.7% 29.8%
1-3 years 9.5% 28.7% 2.7%
3+ years 2.9% 19.6% 0.6%
Total WGP DWL 33.1%
Column one shows the job finding rate for untreated unemployed. Column two shows
the percentage of WGP participants per category of unemployment duration.11 In column
three we have multiplied the numbers from columns one and two which gives the percentage
of WGP participants that would have found a job without treatment, by unemployment
duration (thus the deadweight loss per category of unemployment duration). Finally, adding
10Since our WGP duration categories distinguish between 12-24 months and 24-48 months we could not
directly compare this to the 1-3 years and 3+ years of Groot et al (2008). We chose to split the 24-48 months
category in half and thus add 5.85 percent to both 12-24 and 48+ to obtain a comparable number.
11For an unbiased comparison we have left out the WGP participants that had no unemployment regis-
tration. We only want to observe those participants with a registered unemployment duration and compare
these to untreated unemployed of equal unemployment duration. Therefore we have divided the numbers
from Table 12 in Appendix I by 1-0.182=0.818.
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the numbers in column three gives us the weighted average deadweight loss of the WGP. We
find that 33.1% of the WGP participants would have found a job without the WGP. Recall
from Table 1 that the average job finding rate of WGP participants is 69.6% when measured
one year after exiting the WGP.12 For the period 1999-2005 this is 61.0% (the same period
as covered by the study by Groot et al. (2008)). Thus the (net) treatment effect of the WGP
is 61-33.1=27.9% for the period 1999-2005. Suffice it to say that this contrasts sharply with
the treatment effects of public treatment as reported by Groot et al (2008) and reproduced
here in column 4 of Table 6.
Finally, we would like to point out that the WGP deadweight loss we find is in fact a
conservative result. From the preceding section we have learned that 57.7% of all unemployed
find a job without treatment within the first year of their unemployment spell. At the end of
Section 4.1 we already mentioned that after three months in unemployment, the job finding
rate starts to decline rapidly. This means that a large portion of the 57.7% already find their
job in the first three months and the remainder of the 57.7% is spread over months 4 to 12.
But WGP participants that have only spent up to three months in unemployment before
entering the WGP are spread thin for two reasons. First, if apparently such a relatively
large part of unemployed find a job within the first three months of unemployment, these
persons are out of unemployment so fast on their own that they have therewith selected
themselves out of the ‘selection pool’ of the WGP. Second, even if they would not have left
unemployment so fast, by design the WGP targets predominantly those with the largest
distance to the labor market and they would therefore not pass the selection criteria. All
this implies that if we would be able to further break down the WGP population and the
job finding rates as reported in Table 7, we would expect to find a lower deadweight loss
and a higher treatment effect.
5 What are the benefits to the firm?
There are a number of possible benefits for the firm running a private employment program.
We know from Figure 2 that Philips offers employment to on average fifteen percent of the
participants after completing their WGP treatment. Thus the first possible benefit to the
firm is that the WGP might serve as a fruitful recruitment channel. Table 8 provides some
quantitative evidence that supports this notion. We constructed a subset of participants
who found a job after their WGP treatment and added a dummy with value ‘1’ if this was
a job with Philips, or a value of ‘0’ for a job elsewhere. This allows us to identify which
type of participants Philips favors to offer a regular job. The first result to notice is the
negative relation between the chance of getting a job with Philips and unemployment at
time of outflow. In a period of low unemployment the costs for recruitment and selection
are probably higher for most firms. The negative relation we find here implies that Philips
is more likely to hire former WGP participants in ‘costly’ periods of low unemployment.
Having to spend less money through formal channels for recruitment is the first benefit the
12We use the job finding rate after one year because this aligns best with Groot et al. (2008), who measure
their treatment effects by looking at 1.5 years after treatment.
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Table 8: Who stay with Philips? 1999-2007
Job with Philips
Unemployment at time of outflowa −0.17 ∗ ∗ (0.09)
Gender −0.03 (0.12)
Prior education:
Primary school −0.34 (0.28)
Low level vocational/secondary 0.14 (0.15)
Middle level vocational/secondary reference
High level vocational −0.26 (0.19)
University 0.31∗ (0.18)
Age groups:
Age 16-30 reference
Age 31-40 −0.25∗ (0.14)
Age 41-50 −0.35 ∗ ∗ (0.17)
Age 51+ 0.21 (0.27)
Counseling from UWV −0.04 (0.07)
Constant −0.06 (0.28)
N 549
Correctly classified by probit model 75.96%
∗∗∗ = significant at 1%, ∗∗ = significant at 5%, ∗ = significant at 10%
Standard errors in parentheses
aOn municipal level
program provides. Second, albeit with somewhat weak significance, we find that academi-
cally qualified WGP participants have a higher chance to stay with Philips. Third, middle
aged participants have a lower chance to become employed by Philips compared to the ref-
erence group of 16-30 year old’s. This seems logical if you consider their WGP treatment
as an investment; the youngest participants have the longest possible return on investment
window. Together these three significant results strongly suggest that there is a recruitment
and selection benefit from having the WGP.
Another benefit is that running a private program for unemployed fits perfectly in today’s
era of corporate social responsibility and as such brings the firm some positive externalities.
This proposition featured amongst others, in a questionnaire we sent to 69 Human Resource
Managers of Philips Netherlands. We asked to what extent corporate social responsibil-
ity, the added recruitment channel and improved union relations are perceived as reasons
why Philips runs the WGP. The results are summarized in Table 9, which shows that the
distribution for all three reasons is left-skewed.
This suggests that the WGP benefits the firm in terms of showing corporate social
responsibility, improved unions relations and an added recruitment channel, underscoring
the finding from Table 8. Especially in the Netherlands with its culture of centralized wage
bargaining, the value of good union relations is vital.
A last benefit of this program is that it is used to dampen productivity losses through
the so called ‘combi-project’. This means that the participant can temporarily replace a
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Table 9: Reasons important to run the WGP
Very Unimportant Neutral Important Very
unimportant important
Corp. social responsibility 0% 0% 3% 27% 70%
Added recruitment channel 6% 18% 18% 48% 9%
Improved union relations 15% 9% 39% 33% 3%
N=33
regular employee at times when the latter is away for training. This also implies that the
work experience the participants gets is as close to regular as can be.
6 Conclusion
The paper explored whether a pure private employment program without cream-skimming is
beneficial to both unemployed workers and firms. To this end we analyzed the effectiveness
of a large Dutch firms’ employment program compared to the performance of contemporary
public programs. With a conservative calculation we show that a pure private employment
program without cream-skimming is more effective at re-integrating the unemployed than
public efforts. For the period 1999-2005 we find that the private employment program we
study had a treatment effect of almost 28% and a deadweight loss of just over 33%.
Cream-skimming is effectively eliminated by a carefully designed selection process, in
which the focus on the unemployed who need the treatment most is securely anchored.
Additionally, the treatment itself entails various private components of which the relative
effectiveness has already been established in the literature and confirmed by this paper. The
most important of these is that the work experience gained during the treatment resembles
a regular job as closely as possible which provides a direct way of signalling one’s capabilities
to future employers.
Interesting from both a business and policymaker’s perspective is that running a private
employment program also brings benefits to the firm. Evidence presented in section 5 shows
that the program serves as a fruitful recruitment channel, contributes to the firm’s image of
corporate social responsibility, helps improve union relations and can dampen productivity
losses that occur when regular staff receives off-the-job training.
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Appendix I: Data on individuals in the WGP
In our analysis we have used two datasets on individuals. On the one hand data on 8928
individual participants of the WGP. This dataset was originally extracted from Philips’
administrative systems and is the most integral collection of WGP participants available,
containing 75 percent of all WGP participants ever. On the other hand we obtained data on
1042 former WGP participants interviewed six weeks after the end of their WGP treatment
in the period 1997-2007. Both datasets are described briefly below.
‘8900 dataset’
This large sample size comes with a trade-off since the information we have per participant
is limited to a number of ‘bread and butter’ variables. Table 10 summarizes the most
important variables in this dataset. Looking at the various statistics in the table, especially
Table 10: Summary of main variables ‘8900 dataset’.
Variable (N=8928) N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Startyear WGP treatment 8928 1983 2009
Endyear WGP treatment 8712 1983 2009
Duration WGP treatment (months) 8712 10.0 4.5 0 24
Age 8928 28.5 8.2 16 60
Level of prior education (years of school) 7150 10.3 2.9 6 16
N Male Female
Gender 8928 5187 3741
Residential address 8928
the means and standard deviations, we can state that the WGP inflow is quite heterogeneous.
Moreover, although this was never recorded accurately enough to be used as a variable, we
know from working with the data and from qualitative sources that there is also a large
variation in ethnicity of participants. The level of prior education was originally defined in
eight categories specific to the Dutch education system. Table 11 provides the number of
WGP participants from each educational background. For later analysis we translated these
categories into ’years of school’ as shown in the last column.
Table 11: Prior education level of WGP participants.
Prior education N % Years of school
LO (Primary school) }
LO + LBO: Primary
1280 17.9 6
LBO (Low level vocational) 1581 22.1 9
MAVO (low level secondary) }
MAVO - VWO: Secondary
1022 14.3 10
MBO (middle level vocational) 1302 18.2 10.5
HAVO (middle level secondary) 466 6.5 11
VWO (top level secondary) 183 2.6 12
HBO (high level vocational) }
HBO + WO: Tertiary
813 11.4 15
WO (university) 503 7.0 16
In addition, Figure 3 shows the education level of the WGP inflow over time rescaled
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to a standard three category scale. Especially the nineties were characterized by a marked
increase in participants with tertiary education. Facing 7,000 high skilled unemployed in
the area of South-east Brabant (where Philips has its origins and many of its plants and
offices), Philips and the local UWV-predecessor agreed to target this group with the WGP.
As a consequence in 1994 and 1995 the inflow of high skilled unemployed peaks and remains
high throughout the second half of the decade.13
Figure 3: Education level of WGP inflow over time
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Based on data from our ‘8900 dataset’
‘Interview dataset’
The most detailed information on individuals who have participated in the WGP comes
from ‘Interview dataset’. This dataset stems from Philips databases in which the answers
to the aforementioned interviews were recorded. It contains the answers of 1042 former
WGP participants interviewed six weeks after the end of their WGP treatment. Table 12
summarizes the main variables.
The substantial variations in age, prior education and unemployment duration confirm
the heterogeneity of participants observed in Table 10. In addition to the variables reported
in the table, the ‘Interview dataset’ contains data on participant satisfaction with the WGP
treatment and answers to questions that enquire about the intensity of supervision partici-
pants received from both Philips as well as the Labor Office.
In Appendix III we show that the ‘Interview dataset’ can be considered a representative
sample of the large ‘8900 dataset’ as it displays very similar movements in gender and
age composition of participants. Due to differences in how prior education was defined in
both datasets, we could not construct a reasonable comparison of this characteristic (even
13Comparing Figures 2 and 3 we also see an all-time peak in former WGP participants being employed
by Philips in the same period. This already hints at a possible relation between a high skill level at entry
and chances of being employed by Philips, as we will formally show in Section 3.
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Table 12: Summary of main variables ‘Interview dataset’.
Variable (N=1038) N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Startyear WGP 1038 1997 2006
Endyear WGP 1038 1999 2007
Age 1038 35.2 9.6 17 58
Prior education (years of school) 1012 11.6 2.8 6 16
N n.r. < 6m 6-12m 12-24m 24-48m > 48m
Unemployment before WGP 1025 18.2% 21.7% 20.6% 17.6% 11.7% 10.2%
Yes Yes Yes No No
N Philips Elsewhere Temp Study No
Job after WGP 1022 13.6% 20.6% 21.8% 3.0% 41.0%
N Male Female
Gender 1038 55.6% 44.4%
WGP location/Philips outleta 1035
though we managed to translate them both into ’years of education’). In the ‘8900 dataset’,
prior education was classified in 8 levels whereas the classification in the ‘Interview dataset’
contained only 5 levels. Especially the lower education levels were more compressed into
aggregates in the ‘Interview dataset’, leading to less accuracy there.
For our analysis we combined all datasets with longitudinal unemployment measures from
Statistics Netherlands, the rate of unemployment and the number of individuals receiving
unemployment benefits, both on several levels of regional aggregation from municipality to
COROP (a regional classification especially suited for labor market analysis) to province.
Appendix II: Regional analysis
Table 13: Effect of labor market conditions on participants quality, 1995-2006
Dependent variable Educational attainmenta
Estimation number 1 2 3 4
Unemployment:
National 0.08 (0.00)∗∗∗
Province 0.07 (0.00)∗∗∗
Corop 0.06 (0.00)∗∗∗
Municipality 0.05 (0.00)∗∗∗
Gender:
Male reference reference reference reference
Female −0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01)
Age cohorts:
16 - 30 years reference reference reference reference
31 - 40 years −0.03 (0.01)∗∗∗ −0.03 (0.01)∗∗∗ −0.04 (0.01)∗∗∗ −0.04 (0.01)∗∗∗
41 - 50 years −0.05 (0.01)∗∗∗ −0.05 (0.01)∗∗∗ −0.06 (0.01)∗∗∗ −0.06 (0.03)∗∗∗
> 50 years −0.04 (0.03) −0.05 (0.03)∗ −0.06 (0.03) ∗ ∗ −0.07 (0.03) ∗ ∗
Constant 0.73 (0.02)∗∗∗ 0.75 (0.02)∗∗∗ 0.79 (0.01)∗∗∗ 0.81 (0.02)∗∗∗
Adj. R2 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05
N 4139 4136 4136 4032
∗∗∗ = significant at 1%, ∗∗ = significant at 5%, ∗ = significant at 10%
a Participant’s years of schooling to labor force average years of schooling ratio
Standard errors in parentheses
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For Tables 13 and 14 we used the number of unemployment benefit claimants as unemploy-
ment measure. This variable is available for all geographical levels. In Table 4 we used a
different unemployment measure (the unemployment rate), which is available for more years
but not for all geographical levels. Both measures show the same pattern and trend.
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Table 14: Explaining participants’ job finding chances, 1995-2006
Job finding dummy
Unemployment at time of outflow:
National −0.54∗∗∗
(0.10)
Province −0.46∗∗∗
(0.08)
Corop −0.44∗∗∗
(0.09)
Municipality −0.36∗∗∗
(0.07)
Unemployment at time of inflow:
National 0.36∗∗∗
(0.10)
Province 0.30∗∗∗
(0.08)
Corop 0.29∗∗∗
(0.09)
Municipality 0.24∗∗∗
(0.07)
Age −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gender 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Prior education:
Primary school −0.09 −0.08 −0.08 −0.11
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Low level vocational/secondary −0.04 −0.03 −0.03 −0.04
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Middle level vocational/secondary reference
High level vocational −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.00
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
University 0.29∗ 0.28∗ 0.27∗ 0.29∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Unemployment status −0.51∗∗∗ −0.51∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗ −0.49∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Unemployment duration:
0-6 months reference
6-12 months 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
12-24 months −0.11 −0.11 −0.10 −0.08
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
24-48 months 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.19
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
48+ months 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
If unemployed, what age:
Age 16-30 reference
Age 31-40 0.35 ∗ ∗ 0.35 ∗ ∗ 0.35 ∗ ∗ 0.34 ∗ ∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Age 41-50 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.30
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Age 51+ 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.29
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Counseling from UWV −0.08 −0.07 −0.06 −0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 2.12∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗ 2.04∗∗∗ 1.96∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38)
N 982.00 982.00 982.00 982.00
∗∗∗ = significant at 1%, ∗∗ = significant at 5%, ∗ = significant at 10%
Standard errors in parentheses
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Appendix III: Representativeness of ‘Interview’ dataset
Figure 4: Mean age of participants by year and dataset
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Figure 5: Number of participants (N) by year and dataset
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